Demand for lobbying can be created by government.
1 Traditionally, scholars have looked at social, demographic, economic and other "bottom-up" factors in explaining the mobilization of interest organizations. Truman, Olson, and others focused our attention on such factors as social disturbances, economic growth and trade, and collective action dilemmas as the most important elements determining the growth and development of interest-group communities. Increasingly, however, scholars have recognized that government activity, far from being only the result of lobbying activity, can also be its cause. As government becomes involved in more areas of the economy, those affected by these activities mobilize. Some do so defensively because they seek to avoid further encroachments and others work proactively because they are involved in the new policies, interacting with government agencies. In either case, policy creates interests. Heinz and colleagues defined an interest group in this way:
It is at the intersection of public policy and the wants and values of private actors that we discover interests. What we call the interests of the groups are not simply valued conditions or goals, such as material riches, moral well-being, or symbolic satisfaction. It is only as these are affected, potentially or in fact, by public policy, by the actions of authoritative public officials, that the valued ends are transformed into political interests that can be sought or opposed by interest groups. (1993, 24) In short, public policy is a source of interest organization mobilization.
Accordingly, as government activity expands into areas previously not the objects of any public policy activities, interests are created and interest organizations are mobilized. Jones and Baumgartner (2005) documented substantial increases in the range and scope of federal government activity across the post-1947 period, and the growth of government is well known. The result of this is that many social or economic organizations that may once have had no interest in public policy and that did not lobby have become active as public policy has expanded to affect them. For any given interest organization, this governmental activity may be either welcome or viewed with hostility. In either case, organizations that once were just "associations" or institutions such as business firms have become "interest organizations"
as their "private wants" have intersected with "public policy." Note that the mobilization of interest groups may involve their creation where none existed before or it may take the form of involvement with public policy matters by organizations that previously had no contact with government. In either case, the resulting population of interest groups is related to the scope of government activity.
The responses of institutions, groups, and associations to the increased scope of public policy are seen in many ways. Long-term social mobilization is apparent as thousands more interest organizations are active now than two generations ago. The "interest-group explosion" noted by Berry and others was mostly a social or private economics phenomenon, to be sure. It stemmed more from social movements and/or economic diversity than from government "pull" factors, certainly. But, once established, these newly mobilized organizations sought to monitor or to influence the future growth and development of those programs that affected them. Environmental, civil rights, and other examples of organizations immediately come to mind. Women's organizations grew in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to increased involvement by the federal government in anti-discrimination policies. While some elements of the women's movement faded from the scene, other organizations maintained keen interest in the continued functioning of these anti-discrimination policies they helped to create. Arms control and nonproliferation organizations developed in the 1970s, and the continued urgency of these matters keeps them active. Baumgartner and Mahoney (2004) documented such coevolutionary linkages between group and state mobilizations in several issue-areas including the environment, civil rights, elderly, and human rights fields in addition to the women's movement. Clearly, there is surely a long-term link between public policy and the mobilization of interest organizations. The period of greatest growth in the size and scope of the U.S. government (the period surrounding 1970) is the same as the period when the "interest-group explosion" was at its height. In the period since the late-1970s when the growth of government programs has slowed, so too has the rate of growth in the interest-group population (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993, ch. 9) . Of course, these general trends mask significant variation by issue-area.
Many scholars have noted the political effects of large public policies; the development of the social security program has caused its beneficiaries to be particularly attuned to its continued financial viability, according to Andrea Campbell's (2005) analysis of the policy feedback effects of social security and the mobilization of the elderly. Campbell suggests that the mobilizational effect of dependence on social security is strong enough to undercut the traditional social class bias which disempowers the relatively poor elderly. Similarly, Mettler's (2005) work on the GI Bill and other programs benefiting the "greatest generation" powerfully affected the political behavior of an entire cohort of Americans. Theda Skocpol's (1992) work has similarly focused on the role of the state as the catalyst for the mobilization of groups. Jack Walker discussed at least two important ways in which government activity affects groups.
First, in discussing policy diffusion across the states, he placed emphasis on the development of national policy communities and the patterns of professional communication that take place there (1969) . The development of policy networks surrounding new public programs is an important part of the coevolution of states and groups that we explore here. Second, Walker (1991) discussed the role of government as a patron or catalyst for the creation of new groups, documenting empirically that a large percentage of groups, especially in the social services domain, benefited from government support or grants and contracts in their early years. Financial support from the government or private foundations was an important element in shaping the interest-group community, he showed. Similarly, Walker brought attention to the growth of government in general to the development of the group system. In sum, many authors working from a long-term perspective and taking either a quantitative or a qualitative approach to the question have shown a strong linkage between group mobilization and government activity.
A shorter-term element is also apparent. Leech et al. (2005) noted that congressional hearings were systematically related to the number of organizations registering to lobby at the federal level, after controlling for economic and other factors expected to account for mobilization. This analysis was based on patterns of lobby registration across 74 issue-areas in repeated six-month time periods. During those periods with more congressional hearings, more organizations were registered to lobby. Policy activity stimulates lobbying; the relationship is clearly multi-directional, but this study showed clear mobilization effects on lobbying communities of federal government activity in a given issue area. In this paper we follow directly on Leech and colleagues' work by linking the policy agendas data they use, which measures annual fluctuations in congressional policy activity across different tissue-areas to state-level interest-group mobilization in those same policy areas.
Our focus here is on an aspect of the general process discussed above -the mobilization of organized interests at the state level in response to policy activities at the federal level. There remain a number of unanswered questions about the precise mechanisms through which these stimulation effects occur, points to which we refer in the conclusion and which clearly merit additional research.
This project contributes to the broader literature on vertical policy diffusion, as policy attention is a necessary precursor to policy diffusion. We are not, of course, the first to study this phenomenon. But much of the prior work has focused on specific policy areas with somewhat mixed results (Mossberger 1999; Hecht 2001; Tews, Busch, and Jorgens. 2003; Daley and Garand 2005; Shipan and Volden 2006) , though the most recent study of five health and welfare innovations did find vertical diffusion a stronger explanation than horizontal diffusion (Karch 2007) . A broader view across multiple policy areas may help to reconcile some of these mixed findings. We first discuss several ways in which policy attention at one level of government might be linked to another and consider several different forms it might take.
We then introduce the model of state level lobby registrations using 1999 measures of the density of organized interests and a measure of Congressional hearings activity over several years. Several versions of the enhanced pooled state-interest guild model are then tested to isolate the nature of the linkage between Congressional activity and state lobbying. We conclude the analysis by considering further questions about and future analyses of cross-level linkages of state and national policy systems.
National Influences on State Lobbying
Let us start with the null hypothesis that Congressional activity and lobbying in the states may well be unrelated to each other. It is true that we have seen a growing nationalization of state lobbying communities in the sense that they are all now increasingly responding in the same manner to a common set of predictor variables (Lowery and Gray 1994a) . And scholars have noted the significant role of state affiliates of national federations in linking of state and national interest systems (Thomas and Hrebenar 1992; Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, and Lehmann 1993) . Yet, despite these observations, state interest communities remain extremely parochial in the sense of being dominated by local rather than national or regional organizations. As of the most recent study in 2002 the vast majority of lobbying organizations were registered in only one state (Wolak, Newmark, McNoldy, Lowery, and Gray 2002) . Accordingly, we might well expect that they would be much more attentive to issues in their home states and not to those attracting the attention of Congress.
Even more broadly, it is not clear that state and national policy agendas are so tightly linked.
Indeed, we know that states' policy agendas vary to a considerable degree The first is a simple contemporaneous effect with both levels of government and their systems of organized interests struggling simultaneously with a common policy disturbance. In this view, lobbying activity and legislative agendas at all levels reflect less each other than real policy issues facing society. Truman (1951, 511) , of course, identified the locus of mobilization in disturbances in society. Organized interests engage in political activity to secure redress on these disturbances. More to the point, it is not obvious that organized interests seek such redress at different levels of government in a purely sequential fashion. Moreover, legislative entrepreneurs at all levels of government have powerful incentives to monitor their constituents' concerns (Wawro 2000; Weissert 1991; Mintrom 1997) . Political parties at all levels too win elections by finding issues on which to campaign (Macdonald and Rabinowitz 2001 A second possible form of linkage is as a substitution effect. In this case, policies are pursued in different venues provided by our federal structure of government in a sequential fashion. This idea was noted by Truman (1951: 323) and further developed by Morton Grodzins (1966) , who argued that the federal systems can be viewed as a structure with many cracks through which influence may be exercised. Scholars such as West, Heith, and Goodwin (1996) and Weissert and Weissert (2002) and journalists such as Johnson and Broder (1996) assigned primary blame for the Clinton fiasco and much of the next decade's stalemate to powerful interests representing the health care industry. As a result of this stalemate, however, the states paid increasing attention to health care policy. Following the demise of the Clinton proposal, many acted by the late 1990s to provide their own prescription drug programs (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2007a) , to adopt a number of new and rigorous regulations of HMOs (Gray, Lowery, and Godwin 2007b) , and to take a number of partial (if usually faltering) steps toward the provision of comprehensive health care to their citizens (Gray, Lowery, Godwin, and Monogan 2005) .
Whether as a cause or effect of all of this state attention to health care policy, organized interests rapidly shifted their attention from Congress to state capitols. Indeed, the health interest sector or guild in the states grew more rapidly than any other during the 1990s (Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2005 Stimulation may come in two types, direct and indirect. The direct stimulation effect is that organizations mobilize in the states in order to become involved in policy domains where they see that federal activities are increasing; they may want to influence state-level implementation, to counter federal involvement by enacting state policies working in the opposite direction, or they may see federal involvement as a sign that political winds favor a state initiative as well. In any of these cases, whether seeking to amplify, modify, or rectify the federal policy activity, federal activity leads directly to the mobilization of interest organizations. The indirect effect is that federal policy activity may cause increased state-level legislative activity. This law-making activity at the state level naturally increases lobbying activity in association with it. While activity in Washington may ultimately be responsible for mobilization, the more proximate cause is a change in the pattern of policy attention in the states. 4 Nathan argued that when society as a whole favors governmental action in a new field or of a new kind, proponents will find it more efficient to concentrate their energy on achieving policy change at the center. But when there is diminished support for governmental action in the society, i.e., during conservative periods, proponents are likely to be most successful in those states where there happens, for whatever reason, to be support for such action. Thus states will move into policy areas as the national government moves out or does not take initiative.
There are strong reasons to suspect that the third hypothesis, the stimulation effect, is most prevalent. In any case, we can devise simple tests to compare the null, the spurious (contemporaneous), the substitution, and the stimulation hypotheses, and we do so below. To do so, we posit two additional expectations in line with the two mechanisms discussed in the previous paragraph. (Wawro 2000) or in the states (Weissert 1991) . Thus, professional politicians monitor their environment for issues to promote. And one important short-cut to monitoring the policy environment directly is to monitor what other politicians in other legislatures are talking about. Indeed, Mintrom's (1997) analysis of the diffusion of school choice legislation across the states shows strong evidence of such policy monitoring. It is a very small step to suggest that such policy monitoring also occurs as a vertical diffusion process across levels of government. Indeed, research on specific policy areas has found of evidence of diffusion of policy innovations running in both directions across nearly all levels of government (Mossberger 1999; Hecht, 2001; Tews, Busch, and Jorgens. 2003; Daley and Garand 2005; Shipan and Volden 2006; Karch, 2007) . Indeed, Shipan and Volden (2006) , echoing our earlier discussion of the role of legislative entrepreneurship, have found that such vertical diffusion is linked to levels of legislative professionalism. Further, more professional legislatures may have greater staff resources and be more closely connected to activities within national policy communities. So, we would expect the stimulation effects to be stronger in states with more professional legislatures.
If our theory and expectations are correct, we expect stimulation effects to be stronger than the null, substitution, and contemporaneous hypotheses, and these tests are easily conducted. Further, we expect the stimulation effect to be more powerful in certain states and in certain issue-areas, a matter also easily suited to empirical testing. We turn to our empirical approach next.
Exploring State-Federal Linkages

Data and Operationalizations
Our empirical approach builds on previously conducted research at both the state and federal levels. Leech et al. (2005) Not all of the registration data discussed in that earlier study could be used in the analysis. Of the 26 categories of interest guilds in the population, The key independent variables beyond the hearings measures are the area and energy terms of the ESA model (Lowery and Gray 1995) . As the potential membership of an interest guild increases, it is 5 Previous work indicates that the stringency of state lobbying registration requirements has little impact on the density (Lowery and Gray 1997; 1994b) and diversity of state interest communities. 6 Briefly, lobby registration lists were gathered by mail or web page from state agencies responsible for their maintenance. After purging the lists of state agencies in states requiring their registration, organizations registered to lobby -rather than individual lobbyists -were coded by organizational type (membership group, institution, or association) and interest content (26 guilds of substantive interests) using directories of organizations and associations and the web pages of individual organizations. A second coder then examined the coding assignments with discrepancies resolved via discussion between the two coders. Only 1.58 percent of the 35,928 organizational lobby registrations in 1997 and a similar number in 1999 could not be coded by type or substantive interest. 7 These included the organizations in the military/veterans, good government, tax, environment, religion, women's issues, and civil rights guilds. Similarly, the small business and the services-of-business guilds were excluded because of their extreme issue diversity, which made it difficult to identify their discrete interests in the bills being considered by state legislatures. Second, the small police/fire guild was combined with the local government guild. 8 Interest organizations frequently move on and off state lobby registration rolls as specific issues wax and wane (Gray and Lowery 1995a Lowery and Gray (2001) report that density dependence results roughly equally from the depression of the birth rates of new registrations and the enhancement of death rates of older organizations in crowded interest systems. 10 These include very narrow indicators that are highly specific to each guild (Lowery and Gray 1995) , intermediate measures such as the number of firms associated with each guild (Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes 2005) , and highly aggregated measures such as total GSP in a state (Wright and Winburn 2002) . While each of these measures of legislative agendas has virtues, our analysis requires a measure of legislative activity in many different issue areas, a level of specificity that is not reached by extant measures. Further, we required a measure of the entire state legislative agenda, and not only bills of high priority to governors or those with roll calls. Given that we spend a considerable part of this analysis considering contemporaneous and lagged effects of the hearings variable, some might ask about the exclusively contemporaneous inclusion of the bill count data in the ESA model as our measure of agenda size. However, Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes (2005) fully examined a variety of specifications for the agenda size variable, finding that a simple contemporaneous inclusion clearly proved to be the superior specification. 13 The database is maintained by LexisNexis, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc, and is available at http://www. nexis.com. The database contains bill text files for all bills considered by each statehouse in a calendar year and provides a separate listing for each revised version of a bill in the database. For example, Alabama House Bill 175, which appropriated $4,564,831 to the Department of Public Health in 1997, was listed five times in the database: one entry was the introductory version, three were revisions, and the fifth was the enacted bill. Each bill is assigned a set of subject codes at the time of consideration. 14 Alternative coding modes were considered, including keyword text searches and bill summary searches. But these were deemed to be infeasible or unreliable because of database limitations. 15 The search terms for the 15 guilds were as follows, with the search terms in parentheses: Agriculture (agriculture), Finance (banking, real estate), Communications (media, telecommunications), Construction (construction), Education (education), health (health), Insurance (insurance), Law (legal), Local Government (municipality, public employees, police, fire), Manufacturing (manufacturing), Natural Resources (gas, oil, minerals), Transportation (highways, transit, airports), Utilities (utilities), and Welfare (social services, charities). Two issues concerning our measure of the size of the policy agenda facing each interest guild deserve further comment. First, we do not believe that the search terms provide a comprehensive count of all of the bills the several guilds attend to as they lobby state legislators. Rather, the measure is designed to tap variations in legislative activity across states and across guilds. After reviewing the issue counts, we are quite confident that they tap this variation. States with extensive natural resources, for example, generated much higher bill counts than those without oil, natural gas, or mining industries. Second, as noted earlier, some bills are counted more than once if they were revised as they moved through the legislative process. Rather than a drawback, we view this aspect of the coding scheme as quite appropriate for our purpose. That is, the attention of organized interests should be heightened as bills proceed further on the road toward becoming law. Our coding scheme taps this greater energy. In 1999, the average guild in the average state generated 117.72 bill counts with a standard deviation of 179.41.
So far, all of the measures were employed by We examine two sets of measures of Congressional hearings: 1998 and 1999. Generally, we expect the 1999 hearings measure to tap a contemporaneous impact of policy issues on federal and state agendas given that there would have been no time for federal activity within 1999 to diffuse to state level mobilization of organized interests in the same year. In contrast, we expect the 1998 hearings measure to tap a vertical diffusion process, whether in the form of a substitution or a stimulation effect given that time would have allowed for a lagged response of one level of government to the other. In practice, however, we will see that sorting out these effects is somewhat difficult given that 1998 and 1999
hearings are correlated at the 0.95 level. We also examined longer lags with hearings data from 1996 and 1997 and we also examined combining the annual measures into biannual counts over four years. These longer lags had little impact on our findings. Thus, we do not report these results.
Our theoretical analysis also suggested several possible interactions. We suggested that impact of federal hearings on the mobilization of state interest organizations might be especially great in policy areas where federal involvement is higher and in states with professional legislators who might have strong incentives to act as policy entrepreneurs. We use quite straightforward measures of each, although we will see that they generate very strong findings. We measure federal involvement with a simple dummy variable scored one identifying five of the 12 policy areas -health, agriculture, education, transportation, and welfare -as more strongly influenced by federal policy activity than the others listed in Appendix 1. Our judgment is based upon the extent to which the federal hearings listed in the Policy Agendas Project indicated that federal financial support or federal regulations would substantially assist, overlap with or interfere with similar programs operated by state governments. In Agriculture the hearings covered farm subsidies, agricultural trade and exports, the plight of the family farm, and the status of the migrant worker, all areas that affect farm programs operated by state governments.
Education hearings coded by the Policy Agendas Project took up a wide variety of topics that vitally affect state education policy at all levels, from Head Start to bilingual education, special education, foreign language training, science education, testing and performance standards, programs for the gifted and talented, distance education, desegregation of schools, charter schools, funding of libraries, arts and humanities education, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and a variety of programs in higher education including loans and grants to students, the GI bill, construction funds for college buildings, and NDEA funding. Federal hearings in the domain of health considered numerous issues that impact the states' ability to reform their health care systems, e.g., the impact of ERISA on the regulation of HMOs, as well as the Medicaid program, and the rising cost of prescription drug coverage (31 states have such programs for seniors). In the transportation area the federal hearings focused on issues of interest to states such as the interstate highway program, federal aid for highway construction, mass transit grants, maintenance funds for bridges, beautification of highways, speed laws, and drunk driving laws. In the welfare area the Congress completed its conversion of the AFDC program to the TANF program, a major overhaul of state welfare programs, changing their entitlement programs to block grants and time-limited programs. Also hearings were held on child nutrition and women's programs of interest to states.
In comparison, the seven remaining policy domains that are a match between the Policy Agendas Project and the State Lobbying Project are policy areas in which the actions of the federal government and state governments are not tightly linked. These seven domains are: banking and finance, communications, government, insurance, law, natural resources, and utilities and energy policy. In most of these domains the federal government regulates private behavior; it is not a funding source, nor a joint regulator. The one exception is Government Operations, which refers to federal government procurement, efficiency and the like, but again not an activity that impacts state governmental operations.
Our theoretical framework also presumes that state legislative professionalism is one of the While the main part of our analysis will focus on the direct impact of federal hearings frequency on lobbying registrations in the states, we will also conduct an additional set of tests of the indirect effects of hearings on state lobby registrations through their impact on the size of state legislative agendas. That is, federal hearings activity may lead state legislators to introduce bills on the subjects of the hearings, which would in turn be expected to influence state lobby registrations given the logic of the ESA model.
The dependent variable in this second set of tests is agenda size as measured by bill counts, which we have already discussed as one of the energy terms of the ESA model. The key independent variables in this analysis are the Congressional hearings measure and their interaction with federal activity and state legislative professionalism, as just discussed. To control for rival explanations of bill introductions, we include a full array of state dummy variables in these models, although these are not reported. We will finally look at the combined direct and indirect effect of lagged hearings. as in all of the models including variants of the Congressional hearings measure. Also as expected, the squared GSP estimates are uniformly negative and significant, indicating that density dependence sets in as interest systems become large. Similarly, the party competition estimates are negative and significant, indicating -given inverse coding -that registrations increase with competition. And the size of the state policy agenda -as measured by bill counts -generated positive, significant estimates. These results are as expected and provide strong support for the ESA model. 16 But this is not a new finding and we will, therefore, have little further to say about the ESA coefficients given that they are included in the models to provide the necessary context within which to assess the impact of the federal hearings variables.
Findings
(Insert Table 1 and 1999 measures is that neither is now discernibly different from zero, precluding our ability to reject the null hypotheses that Congressional hearings have no impact on state lobbying registrations. We have already noted, however, that the two measures are very strongly correlated (r=0.95). Thus, it is likely that collinearity is preventing us from distinguishing their effects. But given the strong positive estimates for both in models 2 and 3 and the fact that the positive estimate for the lagged 1998 variable in model 3 approaches standard significance criteria (t=1.61), we will continue to include it in the model. We will, however, reconsider this decision below in our discussion of model 6. At this point, then, model 3 seems to provide the best specification and indicates that federal hearings do indeed stimulate state lobby registrations in a direct manner when controlling for the standard ESA variables. Our comparison of models 2 and 3 suggests that the stimulation effect (model 3) is more powerful than the potentially spurious explanation associated with the contemporaneous effect (model 2). The substitution effect -a negative relationship between federal activities and state mobilization -receives no support.
In model 5, we include measures and interaction terms designed to distinguish policy areas with greater federal policy involvement and states with greater legislative professionalism. Inclusion of both variables and their interaction terms requires that we interpret our results carefully. Hearings in 1998 now show a slight negative relationship with lobby registrations (b=-0.15) as compared to a slightly stronger positive relationship in the basic model 3 (b=0.16). However, the interaction with areas of federal influence has a positive coefficient of 0.58, suggesting that the overall effect is highly positive for those issue areas with strong federal involvement, negative for those with little federal involvement. Similarly, the interaction between hearings and legislative professionalism is positive (0.11) as well, albeit weakly so at only the 0.10 level. Still, this suggests that those states with more professional legislatures respond significantly more strongly to federal government activities. These complicated interactions create some issues of collinearity in our models (as, for example, the states with highly professional legislatures also tend to be those with the greatest GSP values, an essential control in the ESA model). But the overall picture laid out in Table 1 is that both federal and state policy systems are responding contemporaneously to policy events in the real world. This effect now seems to be independent of the mix of stimulus and substitution effects associated with lagged 1998 hearings and its associated interactions with state legislative professionalism and the 17 This complex interpretation was confirmed in additional analysis where model 2 was run separately under four conditions: 1.) nonprofessional legislature (with the Squire indicator dichotomized into high and low levels of professionalism) and low federal activity, 2.) nonprofessional legislature and high federal activity, 3.) professional legislature and low federal activity, and 4.) professional legislature and high federal activity. The standardized estimates of the 1998 hearings variables were, respectively, -0.12 (t=-2.71), 0.34 (t=4.97), -0.15 (t=-1.13), and 0.63 (t=3.49). Hearings had: 1.) a negative, significant impact in low professionalism-low federal activity conditions, 2.) a slightly negative impact in high professionalism-low federal activity conditions, albeit not significant, 3.) a modest but significantly positive impact in the low professionalism-high federal activity condition, and 4.) a very strong positive impact in the high professionalism-high federal activity condition. (Gray and Lowery 1995b) .
(Insert Table 2 18 We also tried to examine the interactions of federal responsibility and legislative professionalism with the contemporaneous 1999 measure of hearings. At that point, however, collinearity became overwhelming.
influence on state bill introductions in the following year, which then promote lobby registrations. Still, as seen in model 3, both a lagged stimulative and a contemporaneous substitution effect are evident when agenda size is regressed on both 1998 and 1999 hearings. The former is positive, suggesting that more
Congressional hearings in one year are associated with a larger state policy agenda in the following year.
But the latter is positive, suggesting that within any one year, more federal attention to an issue via hearings suppresses the size of the state policy agenda in that policy domain in that same year. This is the opposite of the results in model 1, suggesting that activity of organized interests and bill introductions may not be fully in sync over time (but see: Lowery, Gray, and Fellowes. 2005a ).
Both higher than average number of Congressional hearings produce an estimated 46.27 lobby registrations while lower than average hearings produced only 15.40. In the former case, low federal involvement in general and few hearings in specific indicate a policy area that is likely to be fundamentally a state concern and one in which that national government has chosen to avoid. As a result, we might well expect more lobbying activity at the state level. Still, the very low number of registrations (17.10) under the condition of low federal involvement and high numbers of Congressional hearings is a bit surprising.
One possibility is that this reflects something of a substitution effect with the causality operating in a consistent if mirror image of the health care example of a substitution effect discussed earlier. That is, we might see Congressional hearings in some troubled policy areas in which the national government is not normally involved, but in which there is also little policy activity -and thus relatively few organized interests -at the state level. Congressional hearings on race relations in the 1950s might provide an example of such a substitution effect where the Congress is acting in substitute for state policy makers.
But under the high federal involvement condition, the impact of hearings is obvious and operates in the expected manner. When the Congress holds hearing on issues in which they exercise considerable influence, state lobbying activity increases markedly in the following year.
Conclusion
Scholars have recently turned their attention to closer analysis of the demand function for lobbying by studying how political activity on the part of organized interests is stimulated by legislative agendas (Leech et al. 2005; . We extended these analyses by examining several ways in which policy agendas at the national-and state-levels might be linked so as to stimulate or inhibit the mobilization of organized interests in the states. Our results support several conclusions, all of which point to various ways in which the growth and development of policy activities at the federal level do indeed affect state-level interest group mobilizations. The precise mechanisms and timing associated with these factors should be the object of further research, but the general effects are clear: strong linkages exist between federal policy activities and the subsequent activities of groups in the states.
First, given the positive sign and significance of the 1999 hearings variable in models 6 and 7
from Table 1 , we have evidence of a contemporaneous direct response to on-going events in the political world at both levels of government. We have not highlighted this impact in our discussion of figure 1, which emphases the direct and indirect impacts of lagged hearings, but it is one of the most important of our results. Lobbyists at the state level and members of Congress through hearings are both reacting to the same things; given their powerful incentives to do so, there is no reason to expect them to fail to react to common problems and opportunities.
Second, the results in the same models also provide evidence of a direct lagged substitution effect. That is, the negative and significant estimate of the 1998 hearings suggests that Congressional hearings in one year dampen state lobby registrations in the following year, at least in certain states (those with the least professionalized legislatures) and in certain policy areas (those with the least federal involvement). But the more powerful impact is through stimulating even greater than baseline lobbying activity in states with professionalized legislatures and in policy areas with higher than average levels of federal involvement.
Third, the results in table 2 suggests that Congressional hearings have indirect lagged stimulation and indirect contemporaneous substitution effects on state lobbying activity though their impacts on the size of state policy agendas. These effects of the lagged (1998) and contemporary (1999) hearings variables are the opposite of those observed for the direct effects on lobby registrations. This suggests that it takes time for changes in levels of federal activity to work their way into patterns of bill introductions in the states to which then organized interests then respond. But fourth, levels of professionalism in state legislatures and levels of federal involvement with policy areas influence these indirect (through the size of state policy agendas) effects in the same manner as observed with the direct effects. That is, the size of state policy agendas react more positively to lagged Congressional hearings in states with professional legislatures and in policy areas in which the federal government plays a strong funding and/or regulator role.
The broader interpretation based on all of these results is that state lobby registrations seem to have a very complex direct and indirect response to Congressional hearings activities. More generally still, our results suggest that the processes that govern vertical policy diffusion are many and distinct. In all, these findings provide strong and robust support for the view that organized interests are strongly affected not only by the "bottom-up" factors that have long been studied in the literature and which are reflected in the supply and area variables in the ESA model, but also by the "energy" factors as well. The uncertainty of the state legislative environment, the degree of policy activity in the state, both long-and short-term levels of policy activity apparent at the federal level, and especially the connections among these factors are important forces in stimulating organizations to mobilize either to protect themselves from initiatives they oppose or to take advantage of opportunities to shape new policies they support. But only under certain conditions, an observation that is impossible to derive from studies of diffusion focusing on a single policy. If a diffusion of policy attention is a necessary prerequisite for diffusions of policy innovations, then a broader consideration of the multiple pathways in which federal policy attention influences state-level policy attention in the manner examined here is needed in further studies of the vertical diffusion process. Organized interests react to their environments. Because other levels of government and their activities are a large part of the environment, properly specified models of interest mobilization and the diffusion of policy attention must include measures of government activity. 
